BEGIN:VCALENDAR VERSION:2.0 PRODID:icalendar-ruby CALSCALE:GREGORIAN X-WR-CALNAME:“‘Justice\,’ or ‘Just’ Speech?: How Philosophy Conce ives its Limit\, from Plato through Kant\, Hegel\, and Arendt” A Lecture by Claudia Brodsky X-WR-TIMEZONE:Mountain Time (US & Canada) BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20260710T142302Z UID:tag:localist.com\,2008:EventInstance_42111521491897 DTSTART:20230429T010000Z DTEND:20230429T020000Z DESCRIPTION:“‘Justice\,’ or ‘Just’ Speech?: How Philosophy Concei ves its Limit\, from Plato through Kant\, Hegel\, and Arendt”\n\nLecture by Claudia Brodsky\, Princeton University\n\nFriday\, April 28\, 7:00 p.m .\, Great Hall\n\nThis lecture is part of the Carol J. Worrell annual lect ure series on literature\n\n \n\nThe aim of this paper is to demonstrate t hat\, of all the abstract ideas that actively orient\, ground (or upend) t he practical lives and histories of human beings\, the inherently relation al notion of “justice” is perhaps the most difficult to define. “Jus tice” names a relation of equivalence between two otherwise unrelated ac tions or things. Necessarily comparing -- “weighing” or “taking the measure” – of one “side” of a relation it has itself to invent\, t he identity of “justice” remains two-sided or equivocal in more than o ne literal sense. As first demonstrated in Plato’s Republic\, any attemp t to define the identity of “justice” – most important of all “Ide as” according to the inventor of these\, and with them\, philosophy itse lf -- must engage not only separate identities but distinct semantic field s: the ideational or theoretical and the concrete or practical. The thesis of this paper is that\, in posing the question of the definition of “ju stice\,” Socrates not only opens up the semantic division within languag e between the abstract and the concrete\, but transforms a dialectical dia logue that might have instead come to be entitled Δικαίoσύνη int o the hypothetical account of a mechanically synched (or “ad-justed”) state. The paper further argues that the abrupt turn from the ideational t o the mechanical that seems to render the very question of “justice\,” as of judgment in general\, moot\, indicates the fine line between the le ast delimited (i.e.\, “just” in the highest\, moral sense) and most de limited (“just” in the constricted sense of “merely”) that discurs ive philosophy straddles at its best. With brief related discussions of Ka nt\, Schiller\, Hegel\, Arendt and J. L. Austin.\n\n \n\nClaudia Brodsky e arned her BA in English and Comparative Literature magna cum laude from Ha rvard University and PhD in Comparative Literature from Yale\, where she t aught in the German and Comparative Literature Depts. before joining the D ept. of Comparative Literature at Princeton. She studied in Germany as a DAAD and Humboldt Fellow\, at the Universities of Freiburg\, Munich\, and Constance. Her many articles engage with literary and philosophical 17th- through 20th century works in English\, German\, French\, and Spanish\; he r books include The Imposition of Form: Studies in Narrative Representatio n and Knowledge (1987)\, Lines of Thought: Discourse\, Architectonics\, an d the Origin of Modern Philosophy (1996)\, In the Place of Language: Liter ature and the Architecture of the Referent (2006)\, Words’ Worth: What t he Poet Does (2020)\, and The Linguistic Condition: Kant’s Critique of J udgment and the Poetics of Action (2021). She is co-editor with Toni Morr ison of Birth of a Nation’hood (1997)\, with E. LaBrada of Inventing Age ncy. Essays in the Philosophical and Literary Production of the Modern Sub ject (2017)\, and editor of Kant and Literary Studies (forthcoming Cambrid ge U P\, 2023). GEO:35.666732;-105.912107 LOCATION:Santa Fe Campus\, Great Hall SUMMARY:“‘Justice\,’ or ‘Just’ Speech?: How Philosophy Conceives its Limit\, from Plato through Kant\, Hegel\, and Arendt” A Lecture by C laudia Brodsky URL;VALUE=URI:https://events.sjc.edu/event/a_lecture_by_claudia_brodsky CATEGORIES:Lectures & Presentations END:VEVENT END:VCALENDAR